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NOTES
Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press: Another Look at
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
Toward the close of its 1973 term, a unanimous Supreme Court
struck do,m under the first amendment a Florida statute that required newspapers to give free reply space to political candidates
whom they had attacked in their columns.1 The Court's opinion reaffirmed the principle that the first amendment erects "a virtually
insurmountable barrier"2 between government and the press. The
Court's acceptance and use of this proposition, however, did not
address the specific arguments raised by the statute's defenders. Constitutional scholars and politicians3 had embraced the concepts of
reply and access to the press4 as an answer to the threat posed to first
amendment freedoms by monopolistic concentration in the newspaper industry. While the Court did devote nearly half of its opinion
to a description of the first amendment theory of the access advocates,5 it dismissed that theory summarily, as contrary to precedent.
1. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). FLA. STAT, ANN,
104.38 (Supp. 1973-1974), originally enacted in 1913, provided:
H any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free space
for such putposes, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a
place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided
such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Anr, person
or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree • • • •
A lower court held the statute unconstitutionally vague, and thus invalid under the
due process and free press clauses. State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp, 164
(Volusia County J. Ct. 1972). The Florida circuit court's opinion in Tornillo noted that
the Attorney General of Florida decided not to appeal the News-Journal decision
because he had the same reservations regarding the statute's constitutionality. A 1972
bill in the Florida state legislature attempted to repeal the reply statute but died in
committee. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 S.2d 78, 81 n.8 (Fla. 1973).
2. 418 U.S. at 259. {White, J., concurring).
3. See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); N.Y. Times, June 26,
1974, at 1, coL 6 (late city ed.); id. at 18, cols. 3-8; id., April 24, 1974, at 41, cols. 2-3
(late city ed.).
4. For putposes of this note "right of access" refers both to the right of spokesmen
on various public issues to present their views in mass media and to a right of reply,
whereby the medium allows response to a previously offered view. Distinctions between
reply and access will appear where necessary for clarification.
5. Despite the amount of space dedicated to a delineation of the pro-access argu•
ment, the Court neither explained nor pretended to explain the entire case for
"opening up" the press, Chief Justice Burger referred his audience to a recent article
that summarized the basic position of access advocates. See Lange, The Role of the
Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REv. I (1973). 42 U.S.LW. at 5100. In the past few years numerous
commentators have suggested that the standards for access to other media be applied
to newspapers. See, e.g., J. BARRON, supra note 3; Barron, Access-The Only Choice for
§
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This note does not take issue with the result of the decision.
Rather, the argument herein is that the access theory deserves more
complete consideration. The Court used first amendment precedents
to strike down the reply statute without exploring whether the rationale behind these precedents mandated such a result. In an effort
to justify more fully the Court's conclusion, this note will first present
the underlying rationale of the pro-access argument. It will then
analyze the constitutionality of statutes that would implement a
right of access. Finally, the note will discuss several practical difficulties that access legislation would present.
The controversy that ultimately brought the access theory to the
Supreme Court6 began when the Miami Herald refused Pat Tomillo,
a candidate for the Florida state legislature, space to rebut the paper's
editorial criticisms of his public actions. The Herald thereby violated
the Florida "right to reply" statute, which required a newspaper to
provide free space for the reply of any candidate whose personal
character or official record it had assailed.7 In a per curiam opinion
the Florida supreme court reversed a state circuit court ruling that
the statute infringed upon the freedom of the press guarantees of the
United States and Florida Constitutions.8
the Media?, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 766 (1970); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1663-66 (1967); Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487, 493-502 (1969);
Ervin, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 871, 882-83 (1972);
Note, The Duty of Newspapers To Accept Political Advertising-An Attack on Tradition, 44 IND. L.J. 222, 231-32 (1969); Note, Monopoly Newspapers: Troubles in Paradise,
7 SAN DIEGO L. R.Ev. 268, 284-88 (1970); Note, Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press
Dichotomy: Access to the Press Through Advertising, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 293, 298-99,
314-15 (1969); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. REv. 636, 650-53 (1971).
6. Extensive scholarly discussion of access predated the Tomillo decision. Zechariah
Chafee, writing for the Commission on Freedom of the Press, reports that
[i]n 1939 Max Lerner proposed official machinery to control fraud in the opinion
industries. J. B. S. Hardman, veteran editor of a New York trade-union daily
newspaper, elaborated the idea into a Free Press Authority to regulate the entire
network of the instrumentalities of communication wherever large capitalizations
are a threat. The Authority would exercise wide powers. It would set up a system
of registry of licensing for publishing newspapers and periodicals. Though leaving
journals free to say what they wish and thus supposedly satisfying the Bill of
Rights, it would perform the purpose of assuring the maintenance of open space
and opportunity for free, unliampered expression of opinion by citizens which
differed from the opinions held by publishers and advanced in their papers.
Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS 694-95 (1947). See also Donnelly,
The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 868, 896-900
(1948). The Supreme Court of Mississippi largely vitiated that state's right of reply
statute, Mrss. CoDE. ANN. § 3175 (1942), in Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 S.2d
91 (1953). Nevada repealed a similar statute, NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.570 (1963), in 1969,
replacing it with a retraction statute.
7. FLA. STAT• .ANN. § 104.38 (Supp. 1973-1974). See note 1 supra.
8. Tomillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 S.2d 78 (Fla. 1973), reversing 38
Fla. Supp. 80 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1972). In a brief dissent Judge Boyd attacked both
the statute's vagueness and its consequences for first amendment rights. Although he
acknowledged the offensiveness of certain stories in the press, the judge explained that
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The Florida high court accepted the access advocates' contention
that the dominant purpose of the first amendment guarantee of freepublic attack is "the price one pays for success or notoriety," and denied that "the
muzzling of a free press is ••• the solution to the problem." 287 S.2d at 89. Boyd
stated that veracity was the duty of a free press and would only be diminished by
compulsion to print. 287 S.2d at 89.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law ••• abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ••••" The Supreme
Court applied this prohibition to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Article I, section 4, of the Florida Constitution
provides: "Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects
but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press ••••" A lower state court had earlier
declared the statute unconstitutional, State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164
(Volusia County J. Ct. 1972), but no appeal was taken to the state supreme court. See
note l supra.
Several days before the Florida supreme court announced the Tornillo decision,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also confronted the issue of reply statutes.
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 829 (1973). The
Massachusetts General Assembly had considered a bill similar in many respects to
the Florida statute. The Massachusetts bill forbade any newspaper or periodical of
general circulation to refuse publication of a paid advertisement for political candidates or questions to be submitted to voters if the advertisement responded to an ad
previously published in the newspaper or periodical. A second section of the bill would
have required the journal to charge identical rates for display of political and com•
mercial advertisements.
Aside from the addition of rate regulations and the extension of reply rights to
spokesmen for questions submitted to voters, the Massachusetts bill differed from the
Florida statute in that (1) space for responsive advertisements had to be paid for rather
than provided free of charge; (2) periodicals other than newspapers were subject to
regulation; (3) the right of reply did not extend to editorial attacks but was limited to
paid political advertisements; and (4) violators of the proposed bill would have incurred
civil rather than criminal penalties. In response to a series of questions that the State
Senate had propounded concerning the validity of the proposed bill, the court enunciated the concept that the first amendment is a means of aiding the dissemination of
information. - Mass. at-, 298 N.E.2d at 833. While the Supreme Judicial Court noted
that prior decisions had almost unanimously upheld a newspaper's right to reject
advertising, - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 832, it admitted that, upon demonstrating a
"substantial governmental interest," the state could constitutionally abridge first amend•
ment freedoms. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834. The burden of proving the
existence of a sufficient interest, however, lay with the government, and the court
concluded that the bill "furnishes no legislative findings or other indication of a
substantial and overriding governmental interest that all newspapers and all other
publications of general circulation in this Commonwealth publish all responsive, paid
political advertisements of whatever nature or size." - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 831.
The oourt recognized the problems of a monopolistic press but articulated countervailing difficulties presented by reply statutes. The opinion stated that the broad scope
of the bill exceeded the interest of the state in ensuring the publication of political
ideas. Moreover, the court noted that a reply statute oould discourage the periodicals
from accepting any political advertisements. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 833-34.
Unlike the Florida decision, the Massachusetts opinion distinguished the broadcast•
ing cases from the newspaper situation. The court argued that the physical limitations
of the airwaves, which arguably require regulation of broadcasters, see text at note
48 supra, have no parallel in the newspaper industry. Nor did the court perceive any
counterpart in the newspaper field to the rigorous licensing requirements imposed on
broadcasters, which some have suggested indicate sufficient state action to require broadcasters to grant access to the public. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834.
The Massachusetts court found implicit support for its position in two recent
Supreme Court Decisions. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl.
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dom of the press is to provide an unimpeded flow of information to
the public.9 Since the court found that the statute furthered this goal
by ensuring an opportunity for full public discussion of controversial
issues, it held the statute to be consistent with the first amendment.10
The court asserted also that, as the Supreme Court has defended the
Fairness Doctrine11 as a remedy for the monopoly held by a broadComm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), clarifying a broadcaster's obligations under the Fairness
Doctrine (see note 11 infra), the Supreme Court allowed broadcasters wide discretion
in presenting controversial issues. The Court refused to require broadcast licensees to
grant access to political advertisers, and the Massachusetts court reached the same conclusion regarding newspaper publishers. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834. The state
court noted that while the Supreme Court did not intend CBS to deny Congress the
power to compel broadcasters to accept advertisements, it did uphold an FCC ruling
denying access in the case before it. Thus, the Massachusetts court determined that
CBS excluded any "right of access" from the realm of constitutional rights. - Mass.
at -, 298 N.E.2d at 835-36. Furthermore, the court surmised that both the majority
and dissenting opinions in the recent case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commn. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), in which the Supreme Court
permitted regulation of commercial advertising in newspapers, suggested the invalidity of regulating the content of political speech. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at
834-35. On the assumption that commercial or business aspects of publishing are
subject to regulation, however, the Supreme Judicial Court accepted the constitutionality of display rate equality in the proposed bill. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d
at 835-36.
9. 287 S.2d at 81·82.
10. The court concluded that the statute "enhances rather than abridges freedom of speech and press." 287 S.2d at 80. An additional facet of the statute that
the court found desirable was its specific focus on political campaigns, which ensured
an element of fairness in elections. 287 S.2d at 80-81. The statute was applicable
only to elections, rather than to all public issues, because the Florida legislature
originally enacted it as part of a corrupt election practices act.
11. The Fairness Doctrine provides "that discussion of public issues be presented
on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage.
• • • It is an obligation whose content has been defined in a long series of FCC
rulings in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statutory requirement of
§ 315 of the Communications Act that equal time be allotted all qualified candidates
for public office.'' Red_ Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969)
(footnote omitted). For the first formal announcement of the Doctrine by the FCC
see Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
The statutory right of reply for broadcasters, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a) (Supp. 1974),
qmending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation under
this subsection is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news
documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning
of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in the connection with the presentation of newscasts, news
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caster, so could Florida impose a right of reply to counteract increasing concentration in the newspaper industry.12
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Burger, reversed the
Florida supreme court in a two-tiered response. First, the Court cited
as controlling previous opinions in which it had forbidden government regulation of newspaper content, implying that the doctrine
of stare decisis alone mandated its decision.13 Second, the Court
warned that if publishers had to print responses to controversial
columns, political and electoral coverage would be "blunted or reduced"14 as editors shied from news or commentary to avoid the
requirements and penalties of reply statutes.15 Although the Court
cited some of its own language16 that arguably supported a right to
access, it relied on contrasting quotations suggesting that a "judicial
gloss"17 circumscribes the first amendment and proscribes government regulation of the editorial process.
Advocates of access had not denied that a judicial gloss surrounds
the first amendment, but they had questioned its applicability to the
present structure of the newspaper industry. They asserted that the
first amendment sought to guarantee the generation and dissemination of diverse ideas. In so far as the press has used its first amendment freedom to secure its own financial and political position and
to restrict access to its resources, they argued, it has frustrated this
purpose and should be subject to corrective regulation.
The access advocates ground their conception of the first amendment in the requirements of a working democracy. 18 This approach
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from
the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance.
12. 287 S.2d at 82-83. The Florida court extended the broadcast-newspaper analogy
by proposing the unique hypothesis that since newspapers use electronic media in transmitting information, the principles of Red Lion apply to the press. 287 S.2d at 86-87,
13. 418 U.S. at 254-57.
14. 418 U.S. at 257.
15. 418 U.S. at 257-58.
16. "'Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some,'" 418 U.S. at 252,
quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); the nation is committed to "'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'" debate on public issues. 418 U.S. at
252, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
17. 418 U.S. at 254.
18. In early cases interpreting the first amendment the Court envisioned free
speech as a means of stimulating the circulation of a wide range of ideas. Justifications
for free speech assumed that certain benefits inhere in the mere existence of what
became known as a "marketplace of ideas." In advocating first amendment protection
for the distribution of anti-war leaflets during wartime, Justice Holmes's dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), established the marketplace analogy
and declared the discovery of truth to be the goal best served by its maintenance.
Holmes's analogy to a marketplace developed into an analysis for upholding first
amendment freedoms: Truth is a good to be sought after, truth is best discovered
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emphasizes the importance of assuring that citizens have the information prerequisite to the well-reasoned decisions essential to democratic govemment.19 Access advocates find support for their position
in a line of decisions, culminating in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 in which the Supreme Court articulated the view that the first
amendment serves self-government.21 The relative immunity from
libel suits that the press won in that case was motivated not by the
principle that newspapers should be free from legal obligations, but
by a belief that immunity is necessary to "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .'' 22
Those who favor regulation of newspaper content perceive New
York Times as an incomplete realization of their goals. Thus, although Professor Jerome Barron23 welcomed the principle that newsby competition among a multitude of ideas, and therefore a marketplace of ideas
should be encouraged. See also Learned Hand's definition of the interest protected
by the first amendment in Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950).
19. Barron, 80 HAR.v. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1653-56.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. This view has been most closely associated with the writings of Alexander
Meiklejohn. See A. ME!KLEJOllN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245. See also Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 73 HAR.v. L. REv.
1, 11-12 (1965). The Court has idealized the role of the citizen and his willingness·
to contemplate ideas set before him without questioning whether any individual
makes good use of the available information. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 726 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry
is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised"); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) ("[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered
debate on matters of public importance ••. [is] the core value of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment''); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) ("[a]
broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system
and an open society''). The Florida high court conceived of the first amendment
as a means of allowing citizens to choose among diverse · views. Newspapers were
required to grant a right of reply because, while "[t]here is a right to publish without prior governmental restraint, • • • there is a correlative responsibility that the
public be fully informed." 287 S.2d at 80. The court also noted that "[t]he statute
here under consideration is designed to add to the flow of information and ideas
and does not constitute an incursion upon First Amendment rights or a prior restraint
since no specified newspaper content is excluded." 287 S.2d at 82 (emphasis original).
It should be noted that access advocates assume that the individual citizen in fact
uses the information to good effect.
22. 376 U.S. at 270. The purpose of this principle seemed clear in light of the
Court's acceptance of Madison's rationale for disputing the Alien and Sedition Acts.
"[I']he Constitution created a form of government under which 'The people, not the
government, possess the absolute sovereignty.'" 376 U.S. at 274, quoting Madison, The
Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
569-70 (1876), and "[t]he right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public
officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of
government.'' 376 U.S. at 275.
23. Barron was among Tornillo's attorneys in the Florida case. His article in 80
HARV. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, has been instrumental in the latest round of arguments for press regulation.

192

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '13:186

papers should further "uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate,"
he would accept press immunity only if the Court enforced a corollary responsibility of the press to "allocate space equitably among
ideas competing for public attention." 24 The decision for him represents a "lost opportunity"25 in so far as it encourages newspapers to
publish controversial matter but does not require them to do so.
Proponents of access deem impositions on the press not only as
proper in light of the requirements of a working democracy, but as
warranted by the history of the first amendment. They urge that at
the time of the amendment's adoption "the press was broadly representative of the people it was serving"26 and provided a medium
for lively debate. The framers intended freedom of the press
to be a safeguard against governmental interference with these
functions. 21 Although the amendment has largely succeeded in curbing governmental intrusions, economic developments unforeseeable
in the eighteenth century have created a situation that access advocates believe presents as severe a threat as official intervention.
Economic pressures have caused rapid decreases in the number of
newspaper publishers,28 engendering an industry structure of "one
newspaper towns." Access advocates allege that monopolistic publishers can easily refuse a forum to ideas they find offensive or controversial or with which they simply disagree. The press can, in effect,
practice the censorship of ideas that its freedom was intended to preclude. Proponents of access do not distinguish private from governmental interference with the free flow of ideas,29 and assert that a
24, Barron, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1660.
25. Id, at 1657-60.
26. 418 U.S. at 248.
27. It is in this vein that advocates of access rely on the Supreme Court's declara•
tion that first amendment guarantees are "not for the benefit of the press so much
as for the benefit of all of us." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374. 389 (1967). See also
United States v. Powell, 171 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1959), in which the court granted
a mistrial in a conspiracy case because local newspapers had printed "inflammatory
articles and headlines." 171 F. Supp. at 204. The court, after rebuking the press for
its publications, concluded that "freedom of the press is not for the benefit of the
press but for the benefit of the people. Newspaper publishers, therefore, I1ave a high
degree of responsibility to preserve the doctrine of freedom of the press for the benefit
of the people, not for their own benefit." 171 F. Supp. at 205.
28. The number of newspapers published in the United States has declined from
12,115 in 1950 to 11,324 in 1973, in spite of a large growth in the American population. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISIICAL AllSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 502 (1973).
One may argue, however, that the decline is part of a cycle rather than a continual
downward trend. In 1970, 11,383 newspapers were published in the United States.
Id. The number of newspapers fell from 10,176 to 6,884 during the Depression and
rose to 10,282 by 1947. U.S. DEPT. OF COl\11\IERCE, STATISIICAL AllSTRAcr OF THE UNITED
STATES 462 (1950). The Court in Tornillo recognized the contention that the diminished number of newspapers narrows the public's "ability to respond or to contribute
in a meaningful way to the debate on the issues." 418 U.S. at 250.
29. J. BARRON, supra note 3, at 69-72: Barron, 80 HARV, L. REv. 1641, supra note Ii,
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sufficient state interest exists to require affirmative regulation of
private publishers.
Access advocates are especially concerned with newspaper concentration because they attribute to the communications industry a
unique ability to influence citizens. They assert that media presentations to the reader or viewer control his knowledge and beliefs and
determine his actions. If a newspaper avoids a controversy or refuses
to present all viewpoints, therefore, it correspondingly limits or
prejudices the citizen's approach to the issue. Access advocates thus
find monopolization of a communications industry in a democracy to
be inherently malignant.8° Concerned by what they label an "antipathy to ideas," they suggest that "legal intervention [is necessary] if
novel and unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum ...." 81
Access proponents do not believe that alternative methods of first
amendment expression-handbilling, sound trucks, and picketing,
for example--can adequately counteract bias or indifference in the
mass media.82 They argue that the only satisfactory medium for reat 1641: Johnson &: Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right To Purchase
Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574, 603.07 (1971).
30. Justice Frankfurter characterized the press as having "a relation to the public
interest unlike that of any other enterprise pursued for profit." Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (concurring opinion).
31. Banon, 80 HARV. L REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1641.
32. Id. at 1653. Banon propounds the theory of the "most adequate" forum,
This appears to be equivalent to a right to be effective or to "persuade," see Canby,
The First Amendment Right To Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19
UCLA L. REv. 723 (1972), as well as to reach a specific audience, Apparently one
gauges a speaker's effectiveness by comparing his impact with that of previous
speakers on similar topics. See Canby, supra, at 730·32. A right to be effective requires
individual access to mass media, not only because the advocate can thereby have
the greatest impact on the greatest number of people, but also because the individual
himself will present his position most persuasively. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 188-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
Canby, supra, at 726; Johnson & Westen, supra note 29, at 585-86.
Some commentators have asserted that a right of access is constitutionally com•
pelled, arguing that newspaper publication constitutes state action and that refusals
by the press to grant access to spokesmen for opposing views therefore violate first
amendment prohibitions. They contend that either the press is so entwined in a
relationship with the state that the former becomes a public or quasi-public agent,
see Note, supra note 5, at 227-28, or, by providing a forum for controversy, the press
performs functions traditionally performed by the state. See generally Lange, supra
note 5.
Recent cases, however, such as Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),
suggest that a newspaper's exemptions from statutory requirements and subjection
to duties to publish certain notices probably do not reflect the partnership or
symbiotic relationship between press and state necessary to the state action argument.
Nevertheless, the parameters of state action remain uncertain. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm,, 412 U.S. 94
(1973), indicates that the test for finding government participation in a privately
owned enterprise depends more on epithetical jurisprudence than on any readily
quantifiable criteria. Section ID of that opinion suggested that a broadcaster's · refusal to accept paid political advertising does not constitute "governmental action"
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sponse is the one in which the attack appeared. A statutory right of
access to the identical medium would not only rectify shortcomings
in press coverage but would have the incidental benefit of encouraging citizens to engage directly in political debate.
Several rationales supporting the statutory right of access center
on the important and unique position of the press in society. Early
arguments for regulation of the press alleged the newspaper industry
to be so imbued with a public interest as to be subject to legislative
control,33 a rationale that has justified government regulation of
many private industries.34 Uhlman v. Sherman 35 is a singular case that
for first amendment purposes, despite the fact that government licenses and regulates
broadcasters. The Chief Justice opined that while a broadcast licensee must meet its
obligation as a "public trustee," the FCC's role in enforcing that duty was one of
"overseer," 412 U.S. at 117, and not "partner." 412 U.S. at 119. The regulatory scheme
established by Congress for the broadcast licensees was insufficiently "pervasive" to
remove the journalistic discretion that made the licensee's actions essentially private,
412 U.S. at 120. But see note 75 infra.
Recent Supreme Court opinions have also rejected attempts to expand the public
forum concept. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court
found that a city-operated rapid transit system that sells advertising space on its
vehicles does not constitute a first amendment forum. Thus, the city could legitimately
bar political advertising from the transit system.
More important to the argument that a newspaper constitutes a public forum,
however, are cases that withdraw from the Court's previous willingness to subject
owners of private property to constitutional restraints. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972): Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972). The ability
to regulate private property has emerged from a balancing process relying on and
stressing the primacy of first amendment freedom of speech. E.g., Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 316 (1968). Although
the Court has alluded to the "special solicitude" that courts "properly have shown
••• for the guarantees of the First Amendment," Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551, 568 (1972), in the case of newspapers a countervailing first amendment rightfreedom of the press-contravenes the primacy of freedom of speech, Given the
presumed equ;ility of freedom of press and freedom of speech, the addition of private
property interests shifts the balance in favor of freedom of the press and away from
access legislation. See generally Lange, supra.
33. See Note, Newspaper Regulation and the Public Interest: The Unmasking of
a Myth, 32 Prrr. L. REV. 595, 603-05 (1971).
34. The Supreme Court examined the proposition that a private business could
be subject to regulation if it is "affected with a public interest" in Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). The Court held that the Illinois state legislature could
regulate maximum rates for storage of grain. The factors upon which the Court
relied were the importance of the business to the community at large and the
monopolistic character of the business. The monopoly requirement was discarded
in Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1894). In Wolff Packing
Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), the Court, through Chief Justice
Taft, postulated three categories of private business so affected with a public interest
that they could be subjected to governmental regulation:
I) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering
a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the railroads,
other common carriers and public utilities. 2) Certain occupations, regarded as
exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest
times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or Colonial leg•
islatures for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of the keepers
of inns, cabs, and grist mills • • • • 3) Businesses which though not public at
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contains dicta to this effect. In Uhlman a merchant accused competitors of conspiring to persuade the town newspaper not to accept his
advertisements. The court dismissed the charge for lack of evidence. It expressed the view, however, that the newspaper's status
as a quasi-public corporation bound it to accept the plaintiff's advertisements.86 The court grounded this duty to the public on the
favored position of the press under certain laws, its statutory duty to
publish legal notices, the type of information it publishes, and its role
in society. These factors, the court reasoned, made newspapers
"amenable to reasonable regulations and demands of the public." 37
Although Uhlman stands alone as an example of judicial willingness
to coerce publication, a few other courts have suggested that certain
aspects of the newspaper industry infuse it with a public interest.88
The Florida supreme court in Tornillo seemed to echo this analysis
by emphasizing the role of newspapers in informing the public.89
Apart from the Uhlman anomaly, courts have unanimously rejected regulation of newspapers under a public interest theory. The
their inception may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become
subject in consequence to some government regulation. They have come to hold
such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them.
262 U.S. at 535 (citations omitted). The concept was expanded, or arguably abandoned
on behalf of a broader principle, in Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond
Assn., 313 U.S. 236, 246-46 (1941). The Court, upholding a statute fixing maximum
compensation for private employment agency services, cited an attack on the "affected with a public interest" standard in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536
(1934), and asserted that such a standard was not the proper measure of a statute's
validity.
35. 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. Defiance County 1919).
36. The court declined to issue a mandatory injunction against the newspaper
because sufficient damages had not been proved. The court articulated its theory
for the benefit of the parties, should the case return to court for a decision on the
merits.
37. 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 233, 31 Ohio Dec. at 62.
38. In its consideration of a statute limiting rates to be charged by newspapers
or radio stations for political advertisements, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
contended that while newspapers are not public utilities they are subject to the
police power. Since the statute was interpreted as assuring election fairness (the
rationale used in Tornillo to require regulation of content rather than business
practice), rather than suppressing or censoring the press, the court upheld its validity.
Chronicle &: Gazette Publishing Co. v. Attorney Gen., 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478
(1946). The court also noted, however, that "[t]he present statute does not compel the
plaintiff or any other newspaper to accept political advertising." 94 N.H. at 152-53,
48 A.2d at 481. A vigorous dissent suggested that the newspaper industry may be
completely beyond the reach of legislation. 94 N.H. at 154-56, 48 A.2d at 482-83.
Although the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the right of newspapers to
reject advertisements for adult movies, Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380
Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968), a dissenting judge questioned the status of the
press as a private business and suggested that the decision not be so broadly stated
as to preclude a right of access in monopoly situations, 380 Mich. at 491, 157 ·N.W.2d
at 244.
89. 287 S.2d at 82.

196

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:186

theory has been rejected even where newspapers have monopolized40
and where a paper has thwarted legislative requirements by refusing
to print public notices.41 I}. sorrowful lack of articulation of the reasoning in these cases, however, diminishes their value. They are
largely self-perpetuating, each one merely citing previous decisions
for the proposition that newspapers are beyond regulation by the
government.42
More persuasively, one may argue that past applications of the
public interest theory have justified government regulation of business aspects of an industry only, and provide no support for regulation of newspaper content. The Supreme Court has clearly drawn
this distinction: In submitting the press to antitrust prosecutions,48
NLRB orders,44 and requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 4"
the Court has consistently observed that the regulations at issue affected business concerns rather than content.46 The Court has differentiated regulations that would impinge upon first amendment interests from valid regulations that apply to all businesses, including the
press.47
Closely allied to the public interest theory is the argument that
the same factors that justify government regulation of broadcasters
allow regulation of the press. Access proponents do not argue that
the press shares the problem of physical limitations, which is one rationale for broadcast regulation. Both courts and administrators have
40. Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 S.2d 704, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 143, 177
N.E.2d 586, 587 (1961); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 1281, 247 N.W.
813, 815 (1933).
41. See, e.g., Mack v. Costello, 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913).
42. See, e.g., In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931): Bloss v.
Federated Publications, 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800 (1966), afld., 380 Mich. 485,
157 N.W.2d 241 (1968). A notable exception is the historical analysis by the Supreme
Court of Iowa of industries traditionally held to be affected with a public interest
in Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933).
43. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie
Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
44. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937),
45. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Mabee v. White
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946).
46. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 n.18 (1945), in which
Justice Black, applying antitrust laws to press associations, noted that
[i]t is argued that the decree interferes with freedom "to print as and how one's
reason or one's interest dictates." The decree does not compel AP or its members
to permit publication of anything which their "reason" tells them should not be
published. It only provides that after their "reason" has permitted publication
of news, they shall not, for their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to
limit its publication.
47. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946); Mabee v. White
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946); Associated Press v, NLRB, 301 U.S.
103, 132-33 (1937).
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emphasized that the finite number of frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum requires a licensing scheme that prevents interference
by broadcasters with each other.48 The broadcast analogy argument
focuses instead on the similar dangers to the fulfillment of first
amendment interests that arguably plague both industries. Present
regulation of broadcasters ·concerns more than the problem of
physical restrictions. Regulations affecting the content of broadcasts,
such as the Fairness Doctrine,49 reflect the fear that the limitation on
the number of broadcasters inherent in a licensing scheme might
result in an undesirable narrowing of viewpoints on political issues.
Although defenses of government regulation of broadcasting have
depended upon the fiction that the ainvaves belong to the people,
thus requiring their use in the public interest, 50 implicit in the regulation of content lies the notion that all responsible views should have
an opportunity to reach the public. 51 Thus the Federal Communications Commission promulgated the Fairness Doctrine to ensure that
"radio [would] be maintained as a medium of free speech for the
general public as a whole rather than as an outlet for the purely personal or private interests of the licensee." 52
The parallel danger to first amendment interests in the newspaper
industry stems from currently prevailing economic conditions.
Profitable newspaper publication allegedly requires taking advantage
of economies of scale, which only papers or newspaper chains with
large circulations can achieve. This situation hinders the establishment of new newspapers and contributes to the failure of existing
papers. Consequently, economic limitations create the same potential
for monopoly of political viewpoints that physical limitations create
in the broadcasting industry. It is thus anomalous to allow regulation of the broadcast media and not newspapers.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Communications Commission 53 contains analysis and language that arguably support the media of access proponents to
48. Columbia Broadcasting Sys,, Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94-, 103-04(1973): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969): National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17 (194-3): FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d
16, 40-41, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
49. See note 11 supra.
50. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
51. Such a contention is closely related to the idea that the communications media
play a unique and influential role in a democracy. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
52. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949). The Supreme
Court upheld the Doctrine for similar reasons: it would allow legislation that would
increase "the voices and views presented to the public." Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401 n.28 (1969).
53. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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analogize from broadcast media to the press. The Court in Red Lion
upheld the Fairness Doctrine against a free speech challenge; it established that in an area of scarce resources the Congress and the FCC
do not "violate the First Amendment when they require a radio or
television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and
political editorials." 54 Asserting that the goal of the first amendment
is the creation of an "informed public capable of conducting its own
affairs," 55 the Court found that enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine
"enhance[s] rather than abridge[s]" 56 the accomplishment of this aim.
The Court feared that a contrary decision would sanction "unlimited
private censorship in a medium not open to all," 57 and thereby contravene the spirit of the first amendment. Advocates of access to newspapers would make the existence of scarcity and not its source the
determinative factor, and thereby equate the newspaper and broadcast situation.58
In justifying infringements of licensees' first amendment rights,119
in designating licensees as public trustees, 60 and in promulgating and
validating rules 61 for them, the courts and the FCC have repeatedly
emphasized the unique nature of the broadcast media. Even if one
accepts the much-criticized argument that physical scarcity compels
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

395
395
395
395

U.S. at 396.
U.S. at 392.
U.S. at 375.
U.S. at 392.

Indeed, at least one commentator has interpreted Red Lion as signaling a direct attack on the present structure of press ownership, rather than simply providing
analogies thereto. Professor Barron has written that "[m]y point is that Red Lion
is not just a broadcast case. It is a media case. It represents a look at the first amendment in the light of new social realities of concentration of ownership and control
in :a few hands • • • • It is in the background of these realities that the new first
amendment right of access spoken of by Mr. Justice White should be understood."
.Barron, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 766, supra note 5, at 771. A "first amendment right of
access," however, was not established in Red Lion. Justice White himself, in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), admitted that
"Congress intended that there be no right of access such as claimed in these cases."
412 U.S. at 147 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
59. "Any regulation of radio, especially a system of limited licensees, is in a real
sense an abridgment of the inherent freedom of persons to express themselves by
means of radio communications. It is, however, a necessary and constitutional abridge•
ment in order to prevent chaotic interference from destroying the great potential
of this medium for public enlightenment and entertainment." Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949).
60. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-14
(1973); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949).
61. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969). Summarizing
the majority's argument in Red Lion, Chief Justice Burger :tated that "Mr. Justice
White's opinion • • • makes clear that the broadcast media pose unique and special
problems not present in the traditional free speech case. Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject to an inherent physical limitation." Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973). See also Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 387 (1973).
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regulation of broadcasting content,62 distinctions between electronic
communications and the press may defeat the analogy from one industry to the other. The crucial issue, then, is whether economic factors today in fact create in the newspaper industry a situation tantamount to the situation that precipitated broadcast regulation. Does
the need to control the power of a concentrated and unfettered press
to mold opinions constitute the compelling state interest that access
advocates must demonstrate to justify legislation infringing on first
amendment rights? 63
Uncertainties in proof underlie the broadcast analogy in at least
four respects. First, recent studies indicate that weak competition in
the newspaper industry has been a consequence of inadequate enforcement of antitrust laws as well as of the need to achieve economies of scale.64 I£ the dearth of newspapers65 is traceable to anticompetitive practices, it may be preferable to attack the problem by
enforcing the fair trade and antitrust laws instead of imposing content regulations.
Second, the extent to which the press actually denies a forum to
controversial viewpoints is unknown. While the few examples given
in pro-access literature66 surely do not exhaust the instances in which
newspapers have denied access to deserving spokesman, no empirical
data exist on the number of refusals. Such data would provide a more
valid measure of the state's interest in regulating the press than does
the unproved hypothesis that monopoly publication leads to irresponsible publication.
62. The Fairness Doctrine is not without opponents. For arguments that similarities between broadcasting media and the press should lead to greater broadcasting
freedom, rather than to newspaper regulations, see Goldberg, A Proposal To Deregulate Broadcast Programming, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 73 (1973); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & ECON. 15 (1967);
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Obseroations on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 150-63 (1967); Note, Concepts of
the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83 (1972).
Some commentators have argued that the advent of cable television and the subsequent multiplicity of channels available in any one area has vitiated the "physical
scarcity'' rationale for the Fairness Doctrine. But see Canby, supra note 32, at 744-46.
63. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
.
64. Flynn, Legislation-Antitrust and the Newspapers: A Comment on S. 1312, 22
VAND. L. REv. 103, 122-25 (1968); Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper
Industry, 82 HARv. L. REv. 319, 352-66 (1968).
65. The assertion that such a dearth exists should not be accepted too swiftly. See
note 28 supra.
66. Standard cases relied on by proponents of regulation include Amalgamated
.Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afjd., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Oir.
1972); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo.
1971).
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Third, advocates of access have not adequately defined the communications counterpart of the product market that must be defined
in a claim of monopoly under the Sherman Act. 67 On the assumption
that the various media differ in impact, proponents of right to reply
regulation have rejected the argument that the availability of alterna•
tive communications media mitigates the effects of concentration in
newspapers.
Such an assumption reveals the fourth weakness in the argument
that there is a compelling need to regulate content. Proponents of
access embrace the proposition that information and opinion purveyed by a medium strongly influence its audience. The actual im•
pact of the mass media, however, may be too imprecise to satisfy the
compelling state interest standard. Studies of voter reactions to
political advertisements tend to support Professor Louis Jaffe's contention that the causal relationship between television 68 and "political consciousness" is not clear enough to provide the necessary basis
for legislation. 69 A survey of reactions to political commercials during
the 1972 presidential campaign reveals that, while there was an inverse relationship between the effect on the viewer of advertisements
and the degree of his political interest, many viewers simply voted
according to their previous dispositions. 7° Furthermore, the survey
found that the ability of television commercials to penetrate voter
resistance was no greater than that of political messages in other
media,71
Aside from these empirical deficiencies, the broadcast analogy
founders on a difference between the root of the monopoly supposedly ameliorated by broadcast regulations and the source of concentration in the newspaper industry. Because broadcasters are
governmentally licensed monopolies, one may defend the Fairness
Doctrine as a means of avoiding any appearance of partisanship in the
allocation of licenses. Lack of government participation in the establishment and operation of newspapers, however, makes this argument
inapplicable to them.
The preceding analysis suggests that neither the public interest
theory nor the broadcast analogy persuasively validates access statutes.
If such statutes would in fact further the first amendment goal of
67. See, e.g., United States v. E.I, du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 877 (1956);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), afjd. except as to decree,
384 U.S. 563 (1966).
68, Any argument that calls into question the impact of television advertisements
would seemingly apply to newspaper editorials.
69. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness
and Access, 85 HARv. L REv. 768, 768-71 (1972). But see Canby, supra note 32, at
739-41.
70. New York Times, Feb, 17, 1974, § I, at l'l, col. 1 (late city ed.).
71. Id.
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providing the information necessary to informed self-government,
however, then this analysis does not adequately meet the pro-access
arguments.
There are, however, alternatives to the "informed self-government" interpretation of first amendment goals. The Supreme Court's
decision in Tornillo suggests a different theory of freedom of the
press that, if accepted, would vitiate access statutes. Throughout the
last part of the opinion, Chief Justice Burger alluded to the need to
protect editorial discretion from governmental interference, despite
the possibly undesirable consequences of press autonomy. Although
freedom of the press was obviously proffered in the hope that newspaper publication would benefit the community, Burger concluded
that the press may not be coerced in any way to serve the public, because a "responsible press" is neither mandated by the Constitution
nor attainable by legislation.72 Indeed, one may infer from Burger's
opinion that the press is granted total autonomy for the very purpose
of avoiding governmental decisions concerning the adequacy of its
performance.73
The Chief Justice has emerged as the Court's leading proponent
of the autonomy theory; in the process he has articulated an almost
boundless range of editorial discretion. In Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,74 Chief Justice
Burger suggested that only two factors-the need to attract readers
and advertisers and the journalistic integrity of editors and joumalists-c~mld limit the editorial power of a private newspaper.75 Ac72. 418 U.S. at 256. Presumably, press autonomy would still be limited by the
need to protect public safety or national security. See New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
A recent article from the New York Times, Dec. 30, 1973, § I, at 15, col. 6 (late city
ed.), points out the type of irresponsibility that may be a cost of press freedom:
Winchester's new antipomography ordinance may not take effect because the
local newspaper says its language is not in good taste.
In an article explaining the position, Richard Wise, publisher of the Winchester News Gazette and Journal Herald, said:
.
''We are not questioning the wisdom of the ordinance itself or the constitutional right of persons to buy or sell such material. Rather, we are simply exercising
our right to print only matter which we feel is reasonable or tasteful and we
do not believe the language with definitions is in good taste."
Winchester ordinances must be printed in a Winchester newspaper of general
circulation in order to take effect, and Mr. Wise has the only one.
If the purpose of the ordinance is merely to provide notice to the residents of
Winchester, perhaps other means can be found. The existence of alternatives, however, does not eliminate the embarrassment that advocates of a free press must feel
upon realizing that private enterprise may use constitutional shields to frustrate the
workings of a democratically elected government.
73. 418 U.S. at 258 &: n.24.
74. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
75. 412 U.S. at 117. Although Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion
in CBS, only two other justices concurred in the part of the opinion in which he
expressed his view of press autonomy. Dissents from that part, however, were directed
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cordingly, editorial discretion is so broad that governmental regulation of newspapers is forbidden not only with respect to content, but
also as to matters that will tangentially affect content, such as the size
of the paper and the costs of printing and composing time and materials.76 Indeed, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations77 the Chief Justice dissented from an opinion
holding that a city ordinance could constitutionally forbid newspapers to carry "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated
columns, on the ground that freedom of the press includes the right
of a newspaper to arrange the content of its columns as it sees fit. 78
If the Court adopts the autonomy theory interpretation of the
first amendment, as perhaps it has in Tornillo, all proposals to legislate newspaper responsibility in order to achieve some other end,
such as informed self-government, would be indefensible. Even if the
Court maintains the view that the first amendment seeks to
strengthen self-government, however, a statute that compels newspapers to publish specific material may in fact frustrate that goal.
The remainder of this note will consider the possible effects that an
access statute would have on the very first amendment values access
advocates claim it will further.
Even if one accepts the proposition that the framers of the first
amendment sought to strengthen self-government by encouraging
the free :flow of information, self-government requires more than the
mere dissemination of ideas. It also contemplates participation by
the citizenry-not only through exercise of the franchise but through
constant discussion of public issues. Tp.e first amendment, therefore,
requires the maintenance of an atmosphere in which citizens feel
free to engage in unhampered political expression. 70
The courts have recognized that the right of expression is fragile
and that the exercise of protected speech may be easily defeated. 80
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has drawn a broad mantle of proat the Chief Justice's conclusion that broadcasting does not constitute state action
rather than at the press autonomy discussion. See also 412 U.S. at 120-21.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57.
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
413 U.S. at 394-95.

Thus, in a town meeting, the institution "commonly, and rightly, regarded
as a model by which free political procedures may be measured," Meiklejohn affords
to every man "a right and a duty to his think own thoughts, to e.xprcss them, and
to listen to the arguments of others." A. ME1KLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 24. His
oft-quoted remark that "[w)hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak but
that everything worth saying shall be said," id. at 26, reveals not the desirability of
nonparticipation but only a recognition of the need to regulate speech when many
wish to speak at once.
80. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc, v, Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963),
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tection around first amendment expression. The safeguards include
a sweeping definition of protected speech and strict scrutiny of attempts to regulate first amendment expression for any deterrent effects on participation in political discussions.
The Supreme Court has attempted to protect all speech conceivably within the scope of the first amendment; toward this end
it has given the words of the free speech clause an expansive reading. 81 Breadth of coverage alone, however, will not accomplish first
amendment ends if those who would otherwise speak hesitate for fear
that their words will later be wrongly interpreted to be outside the
sphere of protection. 82 The Court has thus immunized certain libelous
speech because to allow its repression could stifle dissemination of
valuable information. The series of libel cases beginning with New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 83 illustrates the importance the Court
attaches to this principle.84 Witness the Court's statement that if
81. Freedom of press should be afforded the same latitude as freedom of speech.
Professor Chafee has noted:
'\\Te are concerned with freedom of the press rather than with freedom of speech
generally. Does the separate recognition of these two privileges in the First
Amendment have any importance for us? Is constitutional "freedom" somewhat
different in scope for "the press" than for "speech"? Not for the most part. They
appear virtually to coincide as legal concepts. I have not found the courts mentioning any significant difference between these two freedoms in that respect.
There is, however, a difference in fact so far as governmental control is concerned,
for newspapers are more vulnerable than speakers.
z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 34-35. See also United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
82. Courts should thus avoid exceptions to the amendment that depend on flexible
conditions, such as the market structure of the newspaper industry, since changes
in those conditions would threaten the consistent application of first amendment
principles.
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84. After New York Times the Court set aside numerous libel verdicts concerning
public figures. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
The Court has e.xtended broad protection to other areas of first amendment
expression. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute creating a commission that
sought to prevent the distribution of allegedly obscene literature to youths under
18 years of age. The Supreme Court noted lower court findings that the commission's
tactics intimidated book and magazine dealers and suppressed the sale and circulation of certain books. Although some of the books may have been obscene· within
the Court's previous definition of that term, the Attorney General of Rhode Island
had conceded that others were not. The Court thus struck down the entire scheme
as one curtailing "constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated
from obscenity ouly by a dim and uncertain line." 372 U.S. at 66. The sanctity of
the first amendment required that the absence of formal censoring procedures not
preclude the abolition of schemes encouraging self-censorship when the result would
be to restrict arguably constitutional speech. The Court found support for its decision in the vulnerability of first amendment expression "to gravely damaging yet
barely visible encroachments. Our insistence that regulations of obscenity scrupulously
embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards ••• is therefore but a special instance
of the larger principle that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with
adequate bulwarks." 372 U.S. at 66 (citation omitted).
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the freedoms of expression are to have the "~reathing space" that
they "need •.. to survive," misstatements of this kind [negligently
made libels] must have the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments....
Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the
First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further
proliferation, but to insure the ascertainment and publication of
the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.Bu

Although the protection of newspapers that publish falsehoods is
startling, the decisions have a convincing rationale.BB Even libels may
initiate beneficial discussion that would not othenvise easily begin.B7
Moreover, unless newspapers can print stories with impunity after a
reasonable attempt to validate their data, they may decide not to investigate leads and subjects they might othenvise pursue. Instead of
risking these losses, the Court has opted for a broad interpretation of
the first amendment, finding the protection of certain libelous statements preferable to the potential exclusion of valuable information.
The same rationale that justifies the Court's limitation of culpable libel militates against statutory rights of reply and access. If
potentially libelous statements can generate beneficial discussion,
might not this also be true of a newspaper's political endorsements
or expressions of editorial opinion? And, if the Court fears the
deterrent effect of libel suits on first amendment expression, would
not the constant need to litigate the scope of a newspaper's obligation
under access legislation engender similar fears?
The Court has articulated the "chilling effect" doctrine to accommodate these concerns. The doctrine permits a court to strike down
an othenvise valid law if it adversely affects the rights of free speech,
The Court has also deemed administrative censorship in Post Office regulations
to be unconstitutional, Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), and has developed the
concept of overbreadth to strike down statutes that in part proscribe behavior pro•
tected by the first amendment. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 844 (1970).
85. Time, Inc. v, Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 292 (1971), quoting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) and St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732
(1968).
86. Justice White, concurring in Tornillo, noted that "[o]f course, the press is
not always accurate, or even responsible, and may not present full and fair debate
on important public issues. But the balance struck by the First Amendment with
respect to the press is that society must take the risk that occasionally debate on
vital matters will not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints may not be expressed." 418 U.S. at 260.
87. For example, a newspaper may publish a report concerning public officials
that, while itself untrue, leads to clarifications that add to the public's knowledge
of those officials. An example is the controversy surrounding Henry Kissinger's role in
ordering national security wiretaps. See Kissinger's response to the controversy in
N,Y. Times, June 12, 1974, at 34, cols. 1-8, 35, cols. 1-8 (late city ed.).
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press, or assembly.BB A statute is vulnerable to this analysis even if
infringement of first amendment rights is not its primary or intended
purpose; it is enough that there is an incidental or indirect chilling
of protected behavior.B9
The utility of a chilling analysis in the reply statute context depends upon the proof required to establish a chilling effect. Because
statutes challenged under this analysis by definition affect first
amendment rights only indirectly,90 conclusive proof of deterrence
would be difficult. A standard that requires a chilling effect to be
only a possible, rather than a necessary, consequence seems proper.91
A recent articulation of the Court's chilling effect analysis suggests
that accurate measurement of a deterrent effect is unnecessary.
A statute cannot stand if analysis of it produces, "on the basis
of common sense and available information," 92 an affirmative answer to the questions: "(l) whether there [is] a rational connection
between the cause (the governmental action) and the effect (the deterrence or impairment of First Amendment activity), and (2) whether
the effect would occur with some regularity ...." 93
These tests would be met when applied to reply statutes. Confronted with a statutory right of reply,94 a newspaper publisher faces
88. The term also appears in a variety of non-first amendment cases. See Note,
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CouJM, L. REv. 808, 832-4() (1969). But
see Malone v. Emmet, 2'78 F. Supp. 193, 200-01 (M.D. Ala. 196'7).
89. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (19'72) (dictum).
90. See NAACP v. Alabama, 35'7 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) ("[t]he governmental action
challenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties"). Cf. Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
91. But cf. United Mine Workers v. lliinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 21'7, 222
(196'7):
The First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it lefi government free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no
law is passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such. We
have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the exercise of
these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the
purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence.
(Emphasis added.)
92. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. 408 U.S. at 733-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Davis v. !chord, 442 F.2d
1207, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the court defined the considerations inherent
in determining the existence of a chilling effect as including "the source of the chill,
the e.xtent to which it focuses upon the conduct of those who allege it, and the
likelihood that it will affect that conduct."
Justice Douglas has noted that the "monetary and other burdens" imposed on the
press by right of reply statutes are as onerous as other "indirect" restrictions that
the Court had struck down as possibly chilling first amendment expression. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 168 n.18 (19'73) (Douglas, J., concurring). After listing several such cases, Douglas concluded that "[i]n
each instance we held the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that it discouraged or chilled constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, or association."
412 U.S. at 169 n.18.
94. As will become apparent, this argument does not apply to access statutes,
which grant publishing space whenever the publisher covers a public issue inadequately.
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a difficult choice. He may either publish his views and allow the
presentation of contrary opinions or he may withhold his comments,
thereby both shunning controversy and avoiding the necessity of
granting reply space. If he chooses the latter course, the statute will
have produced results diametrically opposed to those intended.0G
That there is a rational connection between the statute and the publisher's silence can hardly be doubted, and, although hard evidence
is not available, silence does not seem an unlikely result.
Assuming the requisite "chill" has been demonstrated, the Court
has traditionally balanced the "chilled" right against the governmental purpose that the statute purports to serve.00 The Court has
heavily weighted the scales in favor of first amendment values-it
upholds chilling statutes only when the state can demonstrate a
"compelling" interest07 and a "relevant correlation" between the
power sought and the aim to be achieved.98
The balancing with respect to access statutes is speculative. We
do not know how much information escapes the public because newspapers refuse to publish it. Nor do we have empirical data that indicates the extent of refusals. This ignorance creates a tension between the competing first amendment values of furthering access and
avoiding chilling effects. Given that the chilling effect doctrine advances goals similar to those supposedly served by access legislation,
and given that the need for and workability of an access right were
not clearly established, the Court in Tornillo apparently resolved
the dilemma in favor of maintaining the potency of the chilling effect
doctrine.
In an enigmatic part of its opinion the Court recognized that the
Florida reply statute might deter publishers' exercise of their first
amendment rights. The Court noted that editors faced with the reply
statute "might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy and that ... political or electoral coverage would be blunted
or reduced." 99 The Court did not use the phrase "chilling effect" and
cited no language that would indicate the degree to which that doctrine had previously been employed.100 Even so, the Court's use of a
95. Recognizing the possibility of a chilling effect, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court spoke of a proposed bill to regulate newspapers, see note 8 supra,
as a "paradox." The court stated that the bill's object of fairer dissemination of
newspaper advertising could, in fact, discourage newspapers from accepting any po•
litical notices. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298 N.E,2d 829,
833-34 (1973).
96. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1949); Note, supra note 88,
at 823-24.
97. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
98. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960).
99. 418 U.S. at 257.
100. The Court cited New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and a
statement in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), to the effect that one of the
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"chilling" analysis in an opinion that struck down a reply statute indicates the primacy of the interest of preventing chilling effects.
There are reasons aside from those mentioned by the Court why
the statute at issue in Tornillo is vulnerable to a chilling analysis.
The Florida law provided criminal penalties for noncompliance,101
thereby reinforcing the reluctance of editors to publish material that
would require response. Even without criminal penalties, however,
reply statutes present additional, indirect deterrents to the publication of controversial material. To include these deterrents under the
chilling effect rubric might stretch that doctrine, but since they produce the same result that traditional chilling analysis seeks to prevent
they are constitutionally relevant.
·
No less an advocate of access than Professor Barron has recognized
that the implementation of an access or reply right will create a host
of practical problems that will ultimately require adjudication.102
The ability of the judiciary to draw lines and to set standards for
those who enforce the right provides Barron's solution to these problems.103 Answers would result from case-by-case judicial resolution.
Since questions of fairness can arise in a multitude of situations, only
constant adjudication over a period of time would generate comprehensive guidelines defining access obligations.
Reliance on the judiciary, however, overlooks a vital point: The
litigation necessary to ascertain the scope of the right of access or
reply in a given instance entails such heavy costs that one who would
othenvise speak may choose the alternative of silence. Reliance on
time,consuming and expensive court suits as a means of resolving
access questions ignores the possibility that newspapers will react to
reply statutes by "steer[ing] far wider of the unlawful zone"104 than is
purposes of the first amendment was to protect free discussion of governmental affairs.
418 U.S. at 257. But the Court ignored statements that would have more strongly
supported its conclusion. In New York Times, for instance, the Court had disallowed
libel actions against newspapers by public officials without a showing of malicious
intent because "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism ••• because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or the fear
of the expense of having to do so." 376 U.S. at 279.
101. See note 1 supra.
102. It is by the judicial process that we shall establish the contours for answers
to questions which a working right of access obviously presents. What is a
minority :point of view? When and where shall such opinions be heard? Has
some significant space already been given to the particitlar controversy? Must
every issue of the publication contain a reference to a particular controversy?
Isn't it possible to reach saturation of a given subject? When is the decision not
to publish on a particular issue a "news" decision and when is it a decision based
upon an effort to obstruct the opinion process?
Barron, 37 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 487, supra note 5, at 496.
103. Id. at 495-97. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSIEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSlON
670 (1970).
104. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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necessary, in order to avoid the cost and uncertainty of judicial determination.100
Difficult questions would inevitably arise regarding the scope of a
reply statute, exacerbating the litigation threat to first amendment
expression. If newspapers alone are covered, are weekly newspapers
subject to the same requirements as dailies? If so, should not weekly
magazines be similarly regulated? Should coverage extend to all magazines, regardless of frequency of publication? Professor Barron answers that no publication could refuse space for purely ideological
reasons. But even that standard would require litigation that may impose deterrent costs on the press.
In accordance with the principle that uncertainty or the risk of
large expenditures may chill free speech,106 the Supreme Court has
struck down procedures that would result in protracted litigation to
determine the first amendment rights of the parties.107 The District of
Columbia Circuit applied this principle in the freedom of the press
area in Washington Post Co. v. Keough.108 Keough, a United States
congressman from New York, brought a libel suit against the Post
and columnist Drew Pearson. The court reversed the court below and
granted summary judgment for the defendants. Judge Wright indicated that summary judgment was a remedy that courts should not
hesitate to use in cases involving a first amendment issue that might
otherwise require protracted litigation. Protracted litigation, Wright
speculated, might lead to self-censorship.100 If the expense and time
demands of a libel lawsuit chill first amendment expression, the fact
that the suit concerns a demand for reply space rather than a libel
should have no significance.
There are additional ways in which a reply statute might deter
first amendment expression. The statute might cause a publisher to
hesitate to express himself on certain topics for fear that his position
105. For an argument that this principle applies to the protection of newspaper
sources see Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 341 (1970).
106. [SJanctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would rresent
a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutiona guarantees .••• A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of
our political system and an open society. Fear of large verdicts in damage suits
for innocent or merely negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense involved
in their defense, must inevitably cause publishers to "steer • • • wider of the
unlawful zone," • • • and thus "create the danger that the legitimate utterance
will be penalized."
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,389 (1967) (citations omitted).
107. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
108. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
109. Noting that the Times doctrine sought not only to protect persons against
libel suits but also to prevent discouragement of first amendment expression, Judge
Wright found that limitations must be imposed on lawsuits brought by public offi•
cials. 365 F.2d at 968. See also note 106 supra.
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will invite ridicule or scorn that he would have to publish in his own
paper.11° The publisher may also hold back for a tactical reason,
fearing that an immediate reply would undermine his position because the respondent, having the last word, might more easily implant his ideas in the mind of the reader.111
Access advocates answer that the increased number of different
opinions in print more than compensates for the publisher's loss. This
reasoning is based on the right to be effective, or to "persuade.''112 It
is by invoking the right to be effective that access advocates create a
conflict bet\veen the usually concurrent first amendment rights of
free speech and free press. The conflict could theoretically be resolved by declaring that one's freedom to speak in reply to a newspaper attack is satisfied by a response in another forum. This solution
would avoid regulation of the press while allowing a speaker to address an audience on the issue, albeit a smaller or different audience
from that which heard the attack. The disparity in the audience is
simply a cost required by the need to maintain press freedom. Access
proponents reject this alternative by asserting a comparative right in
one speaker to choose his forum so as to be as effective as was another
speaker on the same topic.113
But the Supreme Court has never recognized such a right; nor has
it permitted a speaker to ascertain the limits of his own effectiveness.114 On the contrary, despite language that it will not deny access
to public forums merely because alternatives exist,116 the Court has
denied access to even the most traditional forums when countervailing rights so required.116 This balancing process appears most accept110. Such an attitude would especially deter the propagation of radical or novel
ideas, with which access advocates seem most concerned.
111. The right of access occupies a somewhat different status from the other
First Amendment rights we're talking about. Access, the right to reach the public, is not part of the First Amendment in and of itself. Suppose the English
governor had told Tom Paine that he could go ahead and pubijsh all he liked,
but at the back of his pamphlets he would have to allow the governor's assistant
to publish his views to guarantee that he had given the other side. That would
have preserved Tom's right of free speech, but far from being an implementation
of the First Amendment it would have been just the opposite. • . • The First
Amendment does not require the government to enable everyone to reach the
public at large ••••
Ashland, Broadcasting and the First Amendment: Report on a Center Conference, 6
CENTER MAGAZINE, May-June 1973, at 19, 43 (statement by A. Scalia).
112. See Canby, supra note 32.
113. Barron, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1653; Canby, supra note 32,
at 730-32. Canby argues that the true value of access lies in the impact of the subsequent spot advertisements. He holds that the validity of access should therefore not
be tested by a standard that questions the informational value of a speaker's statement.
114. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
115. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
116. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (speaker addressing unruly
crowd); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (use of sound equipment in streets).
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able when the speaker's right conflicts with the freedom of the press.
Even if a reply statute did not cause a publisher to withhold his
opinion entirely, it might well "chill" his first amendment expression
by inducing him to dilute the strength of the statements he does make.
Florida required newspapers to grant reply space only to those candidates for public office whom they assailed. 117 A publisher aware of facts
that he believes should keep a candidate from office might seek to
circumvent the statutory requirement by forgoing a direct attack on
that candidate and choosing instead to endorse the latter's opponent.
Although his endorsement may implicitly reflect criticism of the disfavored candidate, a statute that encourages indirect attacks hardly
furthers robust political debate.
Although the Court in Tornillo recognized that a reply statute
may deter first amendment expression, its avoidance of "chilling
effect" language may indicate an aversion to the doctrine. Several
recent decisions hint that the Court has begun a reevaluation of the
chilling effect analysis. In Laird v. Tatum,11 8 a 1972 opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger, the Court upheld a district court
determination that army surveillance of civilian activities did not
unconstitutionally chill respondents' first amendment rights. The
Court, however, did not reach this conclusion through a balancing
approach; it denied that the surveillance created any chilling effect.110
The Court required proof of such an effect by a showing of immediate danger or direct injury as the result of the challenged governmental action.120 Since respondents could demonstrate no immediate
injury or threat of injury, but only the possibility of later misuse of
gathered information,121 they were denied relief. While the requirement of immediate danger or direct harm may reflect only the traditional requisite that a chilling effect potentially threaten first amendment rights, it suggests that those who challenge statutes on chilling
grounds must carry the greater burden of linking their proposed activLloyd v. Tanner Corp., 407 U.S. 551 (1972), retreats substantially from the position that the Court expressed in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), by holding
that a balancing of alternative forums may support a finding that one forum may be
sacrificed if another is available. The Court in Lloyd stressed private property interests
in holding that handbillers must use "adequate alternative avenues of communication." 407 U.S. at 566-67.
117. See note 1 supra.
118. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
119. 408 U.S. at 11-13. The Court could have reached the same result by admitting
the existence of a chilling effect and employing a balancing test to gauge its adequacy.
The surveillance program was undertaken for the colorably valid purpose of informing army personnel entering an area of the local conditions, and its scale had been
significantly reduced at the time of the decision. 408 U.S. at 5-7.
120. 408 U.S. at 13.
121, 408 U.S. at 18-14.
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ity to a specific government sanction. This would be a departure from
the "breathing space" rationale of traditional chilling effect analysis.
A further distinction that the Court made in Laird could, if it
matures into a new test, significantly diminish the doctrine's utility.
In distinguishing Laird from cases in which the Court had invalidated government action as chilling, Chief Justice Burger
delineated certain categories. In each of the cases in which chilling
was found "the challenged exercise of governmental power was
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations,
proscriptions, or compulsions that. he was challenging."122 This
categorical approach was not essential to the Court's holding, and the
Court did not state that the categories exhausted the cases in which it
would find unconstitutional chilling. The listing of categories, however, is a sharp and unfortunate deviation from the Court's previous
balancing test. The utility of the chilling effect analysis lies in the
security it lends to potential participants in political discussion that
they will not suffer penalties for their expression. A categorical
approach, however, reduces that security in so far as speakers must
fit their claims of a chilling effect into nebulous classifications that
yield no predictable result. For instance, one might argue that Tatum's assertion that information might be used against him at a later
date constituted a valid challenge to governmental power that was
"proscriptive . . . in nature" and that made the complainant "prospectively subject to the ••. proscriptions ... that he was challenging."
The Court's decision to deny newsmen an absolute privilege to
keep their sources of information confidential128 may also signal a
departure from the traditional test for chilling effects. In Branzburg
v. Hayes Justice White's opinion for the majority took note of the
argument that "the flow of news will be diminished by compelling
reporters to aid the grand jury in a criminal investigation. . . .''124
The opinion spoke not of a chilling effect, however, but of "the
inhibiting effect . . • on the willingness of informants to make disclosures."125
Inhibitions on the flow of news differ somewhat from the deterrents to the exercise of first amendment rights that are the objects of
a chilling test.126 Nevertheless, the similarity of the language in
122. 408 U.S. at ll.
123. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
124. 408 U.S. at 693.
125. 408 U.S. at 693.
-126. The term "chilling effect" refers to the direct effect that governmental action,.
has on an individual, rather than the secondary effect of the individual's subsequent
inaction. In classical chilling cases the speak~ is also the individual disseminating
the information. In Branzburg the speaker, or source of information, is chilled from
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Branzburg to that of chilling effect analysis suggests a close analogy
to chilling cases. It may also portend a more difficult standard of
proof. Justice White characterized as "not irrational"127 the fear that
the flow of news would diminish if newsmen were not granted a
privilege. This characterization would seem to fulfill the previously
accepted test for unconstitutionally chilling statutes. Yet, the majority in Branzburg required more. Although empirical datapreviously unnecessary to establish a chilling effect-supporting the
reporters' argument was available, the opinion concluded that "the
evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial
obligations of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such
subpoenas on the ·willingness of informants to make disclosures to
newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative."128
The categorical approach used in Laird and the "significant constriction" standard of Branzburg may be anomalies in first amendment law; this would account for the failure of the Court to discuss
or distinguish those cases in Tornillo. Since Chief Justice Burger
employed neither a traditional chilling analysis nor a categorical or
"significant constriction" standard, however, one may argue that the
Branzburg and Laird approaches are still operative. They may even
have been applied without discussion in Tornillo. If this interpretation is accurate, its consequences are unfortunate. A requirement of
a definite showing that a statute will inhibit first amendment rights
before it will be invalidated neglects the possible reactions to such a
statute. The deterrent effect may not be demonstrable, not only because one cannot determine how much critical expression would have
appeared but for the statute, but also because the statute might induce a publisher to mollify the attacks he does make. 129 To place the
burden of proving these indirect and immeasurable effects on the
plaintiff contravenes the solicitude that the Court has heretofore
shown for first amendment expression.
While a chilling effect analysis militates against implementation
of a right of reply, it is less effective in abrogating a right of access,
which would permit other spokesmen to use the newspaper's columns
whenever the newspaper failed to present adequately all sides of a
controversy. Many of the practical costs that inhere in the chilling
analysis, however, would also be relevant in determining the desirability of an access statute. Although these costs do not reach the
giving information to another person, the reporter, who would be the actual disseminator.
127. 408 U.S. at 693.
128, 408 U.S. at 693-94 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
129. See text following note 117 supra.
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level of a constitutional argument, as the chilling analysis does, they
might, in light of the indefinite need for access that has been demonstrated,180 indicate the undesirability of creating a right of access.
The potential litigation costs that would chill a publisher faced
with a right of reply would also exist in the access setting. Conceivably courts would have to determine repeatedly whether a newspaper had granted one side of a controversial issue sufficient space
to avoid opening its columns to a nonpress spokesman for that side.
If the paper is confronted ·with an access statute that requires presentation of all sides of a controversy, it might have to omit either news
items it would otherwise print or revenue-producing advertisements.
The Court in Tornillo perceived these additional costs, together with
·the time requirements and costs of printing and composing materials,
as a "penalty on the basis of content of a newspaper."131
An access or reply statute providing that the paper need accept
only paid commentary or rebuttal would solve this problem but
create another: Only ideas advocated by persons with sufficient funds,
who are unlikely to be of unorthodox persuasions, would be guaranteed access. The ideas of poor persons would have little more opportunity for exposure than they have at present.132
The real possibility that an uncooperative newspaper could emasculate access legislation might be a final blow to the law's purported
efficacy. Given the clear right of newspapers to print endorsements
of candidates at any time prior to an election,133 a right of access or
reply would be useless to unendorsed candidates if the original
editorial appeared on election eve or election day. Or, by refusing
to grant access until threatened with a lawsuit or court order, a newspaper could assure that the response would be printed only after the
issue had become stale, again frustrating the aims of access legislation.
Even if the Court in Tornillo had seen fit to deal with all of the
arguments posed by access advocates, it would properly have reached
the same result. Deeper analysis reveals that the access arguments are
ill-founded. The broadcast analogy founders on factual and policy
distinctions. Furthermore, enactment of a reply statute might well
have strong deterrent effects on a newspaper's promulgation and
130. See text at notes 63-71 supra.
131. 418 U.S. at 256. A newspaper would face tbe same choice in tbe context of a
reply statute if it published an editorial tbat provoked response.
132. Former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has suggested tbat one means of
avoiding financial discrimination while granting an absolute right of access would be to
specify issues and amounts of time tbat broadcasters would be required to allocate.
In re Democratic Natl. Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 230 (1970) (dissenting opinion). The
majority attacked tbis proposal on tbe basis of tbe licensee's inability to prejudge
tbe amount of time tbat a speaker would require for an effective address. 25 F.C.C. at
228. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 123 (1973).
133. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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publication of ideas. Indeed, the legislation would be self-defeating
to the extent that the press would become less willing to engage in
public debate. Finally, access legislation entails practical costs and is
easily avoidable by a determined newspaper. Despite the supreme importance of a fair press in a democracy, methods other than access
legislation will have to be found in order to assure press responsibility.134
134. Self-regulation by nongovernmental press agencies may be the most viable
constitutional alternative. See THE TwENTIETH CENTuRY FUND TASK FORCE, A FREE AND
R.Esl'ONSIVE PRESS 1-11 (1973); Ritter &: Leibowitz, Press Councils: The Answer to Our
First Amendment Dilemma, 1974 DUKE LJ. 845.

